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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This appeal is brought by the owners of two wind farms, Grouse Creek Wind Park, LLC 
and Grouse Creek Wind Park II, LLC ("Grouse Creek"), of the decision of the Idaho Public 
Utilities Commission ("Idaho PUC" or "Commission") denying the validity of two Firm Energy 
Sales Agreements ("Agreements") between Grouse Creek and Idaho Power Company ("Idaho 
Power"). At its core, this case is about the rate (called the "avoided cost" rate) that Idaho Power 
pays for independent power, the Commission's process of changing eligibility to that rate, and 
the impact that an eligibility change has on developers that have already invested substantial 
time, money and effort into a project. 
In November 2010, the Commission announced that beginning December 14, 2010, only 
wind projects of 100 kilowatts or less would be eligible for contracts at the published rate. Prior 
to this announcement, wind farms up to approximately 21,000 kilowatts in size were entitled to 
the "published" rate. Non-published rates for wind power, then and now, are significantly less 
than published rates. This case is about whether Grouse Creek is legally entitled to the published 
avoided cost rate in effect before December 14, 2010, the date the Commission changed the rate 
eligibility. 
B. PURP A BACKGROUND. 
The Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act of 1978 ("PURP A") mandates that electric 
utilities purchase power from a PURPA qualifying facility ("QF") at the utility's "incremental 
cost of alternative electric energy," which is "the cost to the electric utility of the electric energy 
which, but for the purchase from such [QF], such utility would generate or purchase from 
5 
another source." 1 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") regulations implementing 
PURP A adopt this statutory "but-for/incremental cost" language as the definition of a utility's 
"avoided cost. "2 Simply put, utilities are required to purchase QF power at their respective 
avoided cost and QF developers are given the right to lock-in a "legally enforceable obligation" 
with a purchasing utility, including the date the obligation is created and the rates associated with 
that date. 3 This Court, in A. W Brown v. Idaho Power Co., has recognized a QF' s PURP A right 
to "lock-in" the avoided cost rate as of a certain date.4 FERC has noted in commentary to its 
regulations that the purpose of this "legally enforceable obligation" phrase allowing QFs a lock-
in right is "to prevent a utility from circumventing the requirement that provides capacity credit 
for an eligible qualifying facility merely by refusing to enter into a contract with the qualifying 
facility."5 FERC adopted the term "legally enforceable obligation" rather than "contract" 
specifically to prevent a utility from circumventing its obligation to purchase simply by refusing 
to sign a contract, or, as here, unreasonably delaying the signing of a contract in order to take 
advantage of a lower avoided cost rate. 6 
PURP A is somewhat unique in its establishment of a partnership between FERC and 
state utility commissions regarding the rulemaking and implementation of PURP A. First, 
16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(d). 
18 C.F.R. § 292.101(6) ; see also American Paper Institute, Inc. v. FERC, 461U.S.402, 417-18, 
103 S. Ct. 1921, 1930 (1983). 
18 C.F.R. § 292.304(d) allows a QF to require a utility to purchase power "pursuant to a legally 
enforceable obligation" with rates established "at the option of the qualifying facility" based on "the 
avoided costs calculated at the time the obligation is incurred." FERC Order No. 69, FERC Stats & Regs, 
if 30,128, RM 79-55, Fed. Reg. Vol. 454, No. 38, ifif 12215, 12224 (1980). 
4 A. W Brown Co., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 121Idaho812, 816, 828 P.2d 841, 845 (1992). 
5 Small Power Production and Cogeneration Facilities; Regulations Implementing Section 210 of 
the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Order No. 69, FERC Statutes and Regulations, 
Regulations Preambles 2001-2005 if 30,128, at 30,880 (1980) (subsequent history omitted). 
6 Cedar Creek Wind LLC, 137 FERC if 61,006 at if 36 (2011). 
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PURP A directed FERC to prescribe rules that are to be implemented, in order for QFs to sell 
power to utilities.7 Then, PURPA authorizes state regulatory commissions 'to implement' the 
FERC established rules. 8 Under this partnership, the states and FERC share enforcement powers 
under PURP A. A "state commission may comply with the statutory requirements by issuing 
regulations, by resolving disputes on a case-by-case basis, or by taking other actions reasonably 
designed to give effect to FERC's rules."9 However, a state may take action under PURPA only 
to the extent that that action is in accordance with the FERC's rules. 1° Courts have consistently 
invalidated state commission actions that are inconsistent with FERC's implementing 
1 · 11 regu at10ns. 
An aggrieved party, such as Grouse Creek, may seek judicial review of a state regulatory 
commission decision that improperly implements PURPA12, but may also seek enforcement of 
PURPA before FERC. 13 If FERC determines that a state regulatory commission improperly 
implemented its regulations under PURP A, FERC can bring an "enforcement action" against the 
agency in federal district court, or can decline and allow the QF to enforce PURP A rights against 
a state commission. 
9 
10 
16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(t). 
Id. 
FERCv. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 751, 102 S. Ct. 2126, 72 L. Ed. 2d 532 (1982). 
Id., Cedar Creek, 13 7 FERC ii 61,006 at ii 27. 
II See Mississippi, 456 U.S. at 751 (invalidating state commission's refusal to enforce QF's rights to 
sell to utility); Freehold Cogeneration Associates, L.P. v. Bd. of Regulatory Commn 'rs of State of NJ., 44 
F.3d 1178, 1190-93 (3rd Cir. 1995) (invalidating state commission's attempt to revise QF rates in 
executed contract as inconsistent with Section 21 O(e) of PURPA); Ind. Energy Producers Ass'n, Inc. v. 
Cal. Pub. Util. Comm 'n, 36 F.3d 848, 854-55 (9th Cir. 1994) (invalidating state's attempt to impose 
additional efficiency standards not found in FERC's regulations for cogeneration QFs). 
12 
13 
16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(g). 
16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(h). 
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C. BACKGROUND FACTS. 
The two Grouse Creek wind projects are located on privately owned land near Lynn, 
Utah, close to the Idaho border, with each project separated in distance by more than one mile. 14 
Grouse Creek obtained permits for wind monitoring in 2007 and by 2009, with two years of 
documented wind data, determined to proceed to the development phase. 15 The two Grouse 
Creek wind projects are qualifying facilities ("QFs"), having filed QF self-certification notices 
wit FERC, as required by PURP A.16 
Because the Grouse Creek wind projects are located outside Idaho Power's service 
territory, Grouse Creek needed to electrically interconnect to the grid with a nearby utility and 
arrange with that third party utility to transmit the Grouse Creek electricity to a point of delivery 
on Idaho Power's system. 17 Then, upon receipt of Grouse Creek's energy, Idaho Power would 
need to be able to transmit that energy from its point of delivery to Idaho Power, across Idaho 
Power's system to its point of use, or load. 18 Consequently, Grouse Creek began in May of 2008 
the process of requesting electrical interconnection with nearby Raft River Rural Electric 
Cooperative ("Raft River") and the Bonneville Power Administration ("BP A" or "Bonneville"), 
over an electrical line Raft River owns, but leases to BP A. 19 From this point of first 
14 
15 
16 
Aff. of Christine Mikell iii! 4-11, Ex. pp. 4, 5. 
Id 
16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 et. seq.; 18 C.F.R. § 292.207 (regarding the ability to self-certify as a QF). 
17 See generally Mikell Aff., iii! 16-36, Ex. pp. 6-10. It is common for qualifying facilities to 
transmit or "wheel" their output from the interconnecting utility to a different purchasing utility. See Pub. 
Serv. Co. of NH v. NH Elec. Coop., Inc., 83 FERC if 61,224, iii! 61,998-62,000 (1998) (expressly 
stating that qualifying facilities have the right to use one utility's transmission facilities to deliver to, and 
compel a purchase by, any other utility). 
18 See generally Mikell Aff. at if 34, Ex. pp. 9, 10. 
19 Mikell Aff., iii! 15-25, Ex. pp. 7, 8. 
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interconnection with the grid, Grouse Creek then intended to secure point-to-point ("PTP") 
transmission service from BPA, for delivery to Idaho Power.20 
Grouse Creek's efforts to secure interconnection rights with Raft River/BP A included a 
BP A Feasibility Study (September, 2008), a BPA System Impact Study (September, 2009) a 
BP A Facilities Study (March, 2010), and a signed three-party Interconnection Agreement 
(March 31, 2010) between Grouse Creek, BPA and Raft River.21 These interconnection studies, 
which cost Grouse Creek a total of $116,500, consistently indicated that there was 93 megawatts 
(MW) of electrical transfer capacity available for Grouse Creek on the BP A/Raft River system 
for delivery to Idaho Power.22 Grouse also progressed through the separate process with BPA 
necessary to secure PTP transmission service to Idaho Power's Minidoka substation.23 
Grouse Creek first began formal power purchase agreement (PP A) negotiations with 
Idaho Power in February of 2010 for a single 55 to 65 MW wind farm. 24 Idaho Power told 
Grouse Creek that Grouse Creek would need to reserve firm PTP transmission on BPA's system 
before the Idaho Power would determine whether Idaho Power had available transmission 
capacity ("ATC") sufficient to accommodate the Grouse Creek generation.25 Consequently, on 
June 30, 2010, Grouse Creek paid BPA another $76,000 to study PTP transmission service for 
this first leg of the transmission journey, from Grouse Creek to Idaho Power. Bonneville 
confirmed the availability of PTP transmission service, but also requested a Performance 
Assurance deposit of $794,3 76 from Grouse Creek in order to hold that transmission capacity for 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Id. iii! 26-33, Ex. pp. 8, 9. 
Id. iii! 15-25, Ex. pp. 7, 8. 
Id. iii! 17, 19, Ex. pp. 6, 7. 
Id. iii! 26-33, Ex. pp 8, 9. 
Reconsideration Reply Legal Brief of Grouse Creek, p. 8, R. p. 165. 
Mikell Aff. at ii 34, Ex. pp. 9, 10. 
9 
Grouse Creek26. Grouse Creek declined to make this substantial deposit with BPA, not yet even 
knowing whether once that power was delivered to Idaho Power, what that delivery would cost.27 
Grouse Creek objected to Idaho Power's imposed "chicken and egg dilemma" 28 of 
having to pay more than three-quarters of a million dollars to BP A, before Idaho Power would 
commence studies to determine Idaho Power's cost to accept Grouse Creek power. As explained 
below, this "chicken and egg" stand-off would remain unresolved for six months, until 
December 2, 2010, when Idaho Power finally agreed to remove the requirement that Grouse 
Creek had to first secure BP A transmission rights before Idaho Power would sign PP As with 
Grouse Creek. 29 
In late June of 2010, Grouse Creek also notified Idaho Power that it would not be 
pursuing a single larger wind project and instead would pursue two separate 10 average 
megawatt ("aMW") wind projects.30 On July 14, 2010, Grouse Creek formally requested that 
Idaho Power provide two draft PP As and again requested that Idaho Power begin the A TC 
transmission study of its own system, to move the Grouse Creek energy from its point of 
delivery/receipt to Idaho Power's load.31 To help accelerate the ATC study, Grouse Creek's 
26 
27 
Id. at if 27, Ex. p. 8. 
Id. at if 40, Ex. p. 10. 
28 See Ex. p. 22, Exhibit A to Mikell Aff., Idaho Power March 2, 2010, response to Grouse Creek, 
wherein Idaho Power states that "before [Idaho Power] will even accept an application requesting review 
of available transmission capacity on the Idaho Power system" Grouse Creek must have "secured 
Interconnection from the host utility (Raft river) and ... verified with the transmitting entities(s) (BPA) 
that firm transmission for the full nameplate rating is available to the Idaho Power interconnection point." 
29 See confirmation letter from counsel for Grouse Creek to Idaho Power dated December 2, 2010. 
Ex. p. 167. 
30 In its implementation of PURPA, the Commission had, through a series of prior orders, 
established a regime where QF projects less than 10 average megawatts (aMW) were entitled to standard 
or published avoided cost rates, but projects larger than 10 aMW had to negotiate a rate, based on the 
utility's integrated resource planning model, an exercise that resulted in rates for wind projects 
significantly less than the published avoided cost rate. 
31 Mikell Aff. at iii! 43-45, Ex. pp. 11, 12. 
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July 14, 2010, letter also explained: "Per your suggestion, [Grouse Creek] went ahead and 
confirmed on [Idaho Power's Open Access Same Time Information System website] to the best 
of our ability that there is [transmission] capacity from Minidoka Substation to Treasure Valley 
for Idaho Power to obtain Network Service on behalf of our Qualifying Facilities." 32 Still, Idaho 
Power continued to delay the contract negotiating process by failing to provide PP As, and by 
failing to start the A TC transmission studies.33 By letters dated October 1, 2010, Grouse Creek 
strongly objected to the continuing delays, and to any further delays in Idaho Power commencing 
ATC studies and in providing draft PPAs.34 Yet almost a month later, on October 27, 2010 
Idaho Power had not responded to the Grouse Creek's October 1 letters, so counsel for Grouse 
Creek sent follow-up letters again asking for draft PP As. 35 
On November 1, 2010, Idaho Power, for the first time, provided draft PP As to Grouse 
Creek. 36 These draft PP As were largely form agreements containing material terms and 
conditions established and controlled by prior Idaho PUC orders, and to which Grouse Creek had 
already expressed its acceptance of such common terms.37 However, Idaho Power also notified 
Grouse Creek that Idaho Power had yet to initiate the A TC studies38, again reiterating that 
32 Id. Ex. p. 43. 
33 For example, an Idaho Power representative stated on July 21, 2010, "I have not been able to 
submit the TSR [transmission services request]. Been getting buy in from various people, looks like I will 
probably be filing the TSR sometime next week." See Mikell Aff. at if 46, Ex. p. 12 and Idaho Power 
email, July 21, 2010, Ex. p. 57; see also Idaho Power's June 29, 2010, email stating its routine process 
was to "not develop a draft agreement for a particular project until the interconnection and transmission is 
pinned down" Ex. p. 58. 
34 Id. at iii! 52-57, Ex. pp. 13, 14; see also Exhibit G to Mikell Aff., Ex. pp. 79-85. 
35 Id. at if 58, Ex. p. 14; see also Exhibit H to Mikell Aff., Ex. pp. 96, 97. 
36 Mikell Aff. at iii! 59, 60, Ex. p. 14; see also letter from Idaho Power to Grouse Creek Ex. pp. 99-
156. 
37 See Id. Ex pp. 79 - 83 (containing Grouse Creek's October 1, 2010 letters expressing agreement 
to the standards terms and even listing the prior Commission orders governing such transactions). 
38 Id. at iii! 59-60, Ex. p. 14; see also Ex. pp. 99-156. 
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Grouse Creek "[must] secure firm transmission capacity across all required transmission paths 
[i.e., BPA] to the point of delivery on the Idaho Power electrical system."39 
On November 5, 2010, Idaho Power, by motion before the Commission, requested an 
immediate lowering of the eligibility threshold for wind projects seeking the published avoided 
cost rate, from 10 aMW down to 100 kilowatts ("kW").40 This filing and its request for 
immediate relief would have resulting in denying Grouse Creek access to the published avoided 
cost rate that was fundamental to the financial viability of the Grouse Creek projects. As a 
consequence, on November 8, 2010 Grouse Creek filed complaints against Idaho Power at the 
Commission, alleging, among other things, that Idaho Power had acted in bad faith in its 
insistence that Grouse Creek complete and secure its interconnection and transmission rights 
prior to executing the PPAs.41 
On November 19, 2010, Idaho Power and Grouse Creek agreed to stay the Complaint 
cases and proceed to execute standard QF wind PP As containing the published avoided cost 
rates. Idaho Power also agreed to remove its requirement that Grouse Creek obligate itself to a 
final BP A PIP transmission agreement, prior to Grouse Creek knowing Idaho Power's A TC 
costs assignable to Grouse Creek, and whether the Idaho PUC would approve the PP As with 
Idaho Power.42 On November 24, 2010, Idaho Power sent Grouse Creek a letter requesting that 
Grouse Creek "fill in or correct any of the project specific information" in the previously 
39 Id. 
40 A kilowatt (kW) is 1,000 watts, and a megawatt (MW) is 1,000 kilowatts. A 10 MW electrical 
project, generating 100% of the time, would also be a 10 average MW (aMW) sized project. Wind 
projects do not generate all the time however, so a 21 MW wind project that is generating approximately 
30% of the month is a 10 aMW sized project. 
41 Mikell Aff. at iii! 67-69, Ex. pp. 15, 16. See also Grouse Creek's Motion to Augment Agency 
Record by including the Complaints, which at the date of submittal of this memorandum, the Court had 
yet to rule. 
42 Id. at if 70, Ex. p. 16. 
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provided PP As and "return the draft[ s] to Idaho Power so that the Company can then initiate the 
Sarbanes-Oxley contract approval process and generate executable draft[s] for signatures."43 
Grouse Creek returned the completed drafts on December 2, 2010,44 and on December 9, 
2010, asked Idaho Power whether it would be OK if the start dates for energy production could 
be slipped by six months, in order to accommodate the delayed start ofldaho Power's ATC 
studies.45 
Thus, by December 9, 2010, all material PPA terms and conditions had been finalized. 
Formal execution copies of the Agreements were finalized by Idaho Power and presented to 
counsel for Grouse Creek on December 16, 2010 (but without Idaho Power's signature), and 
counsel for Grouse Creek mailed the executable PP As to Grouse Creek's development manager 
who was not located in Boise.46 Grouse Creek signed on December 21, 2010, and sent the 
Agreements back to Idaho Power; Idaho Power executed the Agreements on December 28, 2010, 
and filed them with the Commission on December 29, 2010.47 
D. COURSE OF IDAHO PUC PROCEEDINGS. 
The Idaho PUC issued a preliminary order on December 3, 2010, declining Idaho 
Power's request to immediately reduce the QF eligibility cap for published avoided cost rates, 
but announcing that that its eventual "decision regarding the 'Joint Motion' to reduce the 
published avoided cost eligibility cap shall become effective on December 142010."48 On 
February 7, 2011, the Idaho PUC then reduced (from 10 aMW to 100 kW49) the eligibility cap 
43 Id. at if 71, Ex. p. 16; see also Ex. pp. 158-164. 
44 Id. at if 72, Ex. p. 16; see also letter from Grouse Creek of December 2, 2010, along with attached 
Agreements, Ex. pp. 167-280. 
45 Id. at if 75, Ex. p. 17; see also email from Grouse Creek Counsel to Idaho Power on December 9, 
2010, Ex. p. 515. 
46 
47 
Id. at iii! 78-79, Ex. pp. 17, 18. See also Grouse Creek Comments, March 24, 2011, R. p. 176. 
Id. at iii! 76-80, Ex. pp. 17, 18. 
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for wind and solar QFs to receive published avoided cost rates,50retroactive to December 14, 
2010. Wind projects exceeding 100 kW were no longer entitled to published avoided cost rates, 
unless such projects had vested in the published rates prior to December 14, 2010. 
On June 8, 2011, the Idaho PUC rejected the Agreements between Idaho Power and 
Grouse Creek, on the grounds that, "[b ]ecause the size of each of those wind projects exceeds 
100 kW, they are not eligible to receive published rate contracts."51 In that order, the 
Commission announced a new "bright line rule" that "a Firm Energy Sales Agreement/Power 
Purchase Agreement must be executed, i.e., signed by both parties to the agreement, prior to the 
effective date of the change in eligibility criteria. 52" That date for Grouse Creek, the Commission 
found, was December 28, 2010, the date when Idaho Power signed the Agreements. Because 
neither party had executed the Agreements prior to December 14, 2010, the Commission held 
that "the rates contained in the Agreements do not comply with [the Idaho PUC's February 7 
Order]."53 Grouse Creek filed a Petition for Reconsideration and on July 27, 2012. The Idaho 
PUC, in Order No. 32299, 54 denied that petition and affirmed its original holding in Order No. 
48 IPUC Order No. 32131, pp. 5, 6, IPUC Case No. GNR-E-10-04, (December 2010) In the Matter 
of the Joint Petition to Acijust the Published Avoided Cost Rate Eligibility Cap. 
49 See footnote 19 for a description of a kilowatt. To make an apples-to-apples comparison of 
average megawatts to kilowatts for an "average" wind project, the wind avoided cost availability cap for 
published rates was reduced from 21,000 kW down to 100 kW, as of December 14, 2010. 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
IPUC Order No. 32176 at p. 9, Id IPUC Case No. GNR-E-10-4. 
IPUC Order No. 3225, June 8, 2010, R. p. 229. 
Id R. p. 230. 
Id. 
R. p. 252, et. seq. 
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32257. On September 7, 2011, Grouse Creek timely filed a notice of appeal to the Idaho 
Supreme Court. 
Concurrent with these proceedings, a separate group of wind QFs, called the Cedar Creek 
Wind QFs, filed a petition for enforcement against the Idaho PUC at FERC, pursuant to 
16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(h). 55 As it had in the Grouse Creek case, the Idaho PUC also applied the 
same "bright line rule" requiring a fully executed contract, to reject the Cedar Creek PP As with 
another Idaho utility, Rocky Mountain Power. On October 4, 2011, FERC issued a declaratory 
order determining that the Idaho PU C's "bright line" rule was in a violation of PURPA and 
FERC's implementing regulations. FERC concluded that the IPUC had failed to recognize that 
"a legally enforceable obligation may be incurred before the formal memorialization of a 
contract to writing."56 
The parties to this appeal thus requested, and this Court granted, a stay of appeal and 
remand back to the Idaho PUC, to allow the Commission to take into account FERC's Cedar 
Creek ruling. In that Idaho PUC Remand case Grouse Creek asserted that it was entitled to the 
pre-December 14, 2010, published avoided cost rates because, like Cedar Creek, Grouse Creek's 
legally enforceable obligation with Idaho Power was established before December 14, 2010. 
Specifically, Grouse Creek asserted that its legally enforceable obligation was established no 
later than December 9, 2010 - the date by which the Grouse Creek projects finalized their in-
service dates, had returned Idaho Power's proposed contracts to Idaho Power, and had agreed to 
all of the terms therein. The Idaho PUC Staff agreed that Grouse Creek had established a "legally 
enforceable obligation" as of December 9, stating in its brief to the Idaho PUC the following: 
55 
56 
See Cedar Creek, 137 FERC if 61,006. 
Id. at if 36. 
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Based on a reasonable interpretation of the facts in this case, and the actions of 
both the projects and Idaho Power, Staff believes that a legally enforceable 
obligation was incurred no later than December 9, 2010-the date upon which the 
projects modified their on-line dates. At that point in time, the projects had 
returned contracts to Idaho Power and agreed to all of the standard terms, 
including the delay liquidated damages provision. Negotiations had taken place 
since early 2010 and the projects had taken sufficient action to show that they had 
committed themselves to sell electricity to Idaho Power. Entitlement to publish 
avoided cost rates changed for wind and solar projects on December 14, 2010. 
Because a legally enforceable obligation was created no later than December 9, 
2010, the Grouse Creek projects are entitled to the published avoided cost rate in 
effect before December 14, 2010.57 
On September 7, 2012, the Idaho PUC issued its Order on Remand,58 for the third time 
rejecting the Grouse Creek Agreements, again on the basis that the Agreements were not signed 
until after December 14, 2010. In a modification to its previously established 'execution-date' 
"bright-line" rule, the Idaho PUC held that "When a contract has been entered into by the parties 
and submitted for approval, there is no need for a determination regarding any other legally 
enforceable obligation."59 As the Agreements noted that their "effective date" was December 
28, 2010, the Commission opined that it need look no further than "the four corners of the 
Agreements"60 and that Grouse Creek was ineligible for pre-December 14, 2014 published rates. 
Finally addressing FERC's Cedar Creek decision, the Idaho PUC said that such a 
Declaratory Order was "not binding" on the Commission; that the Idaho PUC doubted "whether 
FERC understood" the Idaho PUC's basis for rejecting the Cedar Creek contracts; that Grouse 
57 
58 
59 
60 
Staff Legal Brief, Case No. IPC-E-10-61 et al. (Feb. 6, 2012) at 5. R. p. 315 (emphasis added). 
IPUC Order No. 32635, R. p. 346, et. seq. 
Id. R. p. 358. 
Id. R. p. 359. 
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Creek, unlike Cedar Creek, has not petitioned FERC for PURP A enforcement; and that Grouse 
Creek's facts differed from Cedar Creek facts. 61 
On October 19, 2012, Grouse Creek timely filed an amended notice of appeal, requesting 
inclusion in the record of materials filed during the remand proceedings and asserting a new 
issue on appeal relative to the Idaho PUC's order on remand. 62 Additionally, on January 15, 
2013, Grouse Creek filed a petition for enforcement with FERC, pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 824a-
3(h). As of the date of this submittal that petition is still pending at FERC.63 
IV. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the Idaho PUC' s decision that Grouse Creek had failed to establish a 
legally enforceable obligation before December 14, 2010, is an improper and illegal 
implementation of PURPA. Attorney's fees are sought with respect to this issue. 
2. Whether the Idaho PUC's decision that Grouse Creek had failed to establish a 
legally enforceable obligation before December 14, 2010, is a violation of Idaho law, is an 
arbitrary and capricious departure from prior Commission Orders and Idaho case law 
establishing grandfathering rules and rights to prior QF rates, and is unsupported by the record. 
Attorney's fees are sought with respect to this issue. 
3. Whether the Commission's Order No. 32635 is arbitrary and capricious and in 
violation of controlling federal law, PURP A and FERC' s regulations, including but not limited 
to 18 C.F.R. § 292.301 (b ), because the PP As contained agreed-to rates, terms and conditions 
between Grouse Creek and Idaho Power. 
61 Id. R. p. 357. 
62 Id. R. pp. 364-368. 
63 See FERC Docket Nos. EL13-39-000, QFl 1-32-001, QFl 1-33-001 
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V. ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL 
Grouse Creek seeks an award of attorney fees with respect to Issues Nos. land 2, based 
on LC. § 12-121, I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l), and I.A.R. 41, and in conformance with I.A.R. 35. The bases 
for a claim of attorney fees are discussed in Article VIII below. 
VI. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Idaho Constitution gives this Court jurisdiction to review decisions of the Idaho 
Public Utilities Commission.64 LC.§ 61-629 provides that a review on appeal from a 
Commission's order "shall not be extended further than to determine whether the commission 
has regularly pursued its authority, including a determination of whether the order appealed from 
violates any right of the appellant under the constitution of the United States or the state of 
Idaho." 
Regarding questions of fact, the Court's review is limited to whether the Idaho PUC's 
findings are "supported by substantial, competent evidence. "65 A Commission's findings of fact 
will be sustained "unless it appears that the clear weight of the evidence is against its conclusion, 
or that the evidence is strong and persuasive that the Commission abused its discretion."66 In 
regularly pursuing its authority the Commission must also enter finding of fact that are "based on 
competent and substantial evidence" and it must "set forth its reasoning in a rational manner." 67 
64 Idaho Const. art. V, § 9. 
65 A. W. Brown v. Idaho Power Co., 121Idaho812, 815, 828 P.2d 841, 844 (1992). 
66 Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. v. Intermountain Gas Co., 100 Idaho 368, 376, 597 P.2d 1058, 1066 
(1979). 
67 Wash. Water Power Co. v. Idaho Pub. Util. Comm 'n, 101 Idaho 567, 575, 617 P. 2d 1242, 1250 
(1980) 
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Concerning questions of law, the review on appeal "is limited to whether the Idaho 
Public Utilities Commission regularly pursued its authority."68 Factors considered by the Idaho 
PUC that "are consistent with the FERC regulations in determining avoided costs" are sufficient 
to "establish[] that the IPUC regularly pursued its authority and that its findings are supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. "69 
VII. ARGUMENT 
A. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE RULING OF THE IDAHO PUC DETERMINING THAT 
GROUSE CREEK HAD FAILED TO EST AB LISH A LEGALLY ENFORCEABLE OBLIGATION 
PRIOR TO DECEMBER 14, 2010, FOR THE REASON THAT SUCH HOLDING IS A VIOLATION 
OF PURP A AND FERC's RULINGS UNDER PURP A 
1. Legally Enforceable Obligations Under PURPA 
Regulations promulgated by FERC clearly establish that a QF "shall have the option ... 
[t]o provide energy or capacity pursuant to a legally enforceable obligation over a specified 
term, in which case the rates for such purchases shall, at the option of the qualifying facility 
exercised prior to the beginning of the term, be based on ... the avoided costs calculated at the 
time the obligation is incurred''. 70 These regulations clearly mandate the right of a QF to sell 
[i.e., to 'put'] power to a utility at avoided cost rates arising at the time a legally enforceable 
obligation is established by the QF, umelated to whether and when a written contract is fully or 
partially signed between the utility and the QF developer. 
FERC has most recently explained this rule in Cedar Creek, where it stated that "a QF, 
by committing itself to sell to an electric utility, also commits the electric utility to buy from the 
QF; these commitments result either in contracts or in non-contractual, but binding, legally 
68 Rosebud Enterprises, Inc. v. Idaho Pub. Util. Comm 'n, 128 Idaho 624, 631, 917 P.2d 781, 788 
( 1996) (Rosebud II). 
69 
70 
Rosebud II, 128 Idaho at 632, 917 P.2d at 789. 
18 C.F.R. § 292.304(d)(2). (emphasis added). 
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enforceable obligations."71 FERC explained that "a legally enforceable obligation may be 
incurred before the formal memorialization of a contract to writing."72 FERC noted: 
Courts have recognized that negotiations regarding terms that parties to the 
negotiations intend to become a finalized or written contract, may in some 
circumstances result in legally enforceable obligations of those parties 
notwithstanding the absence of a writing.73 
FERC also emphasized "that the phrase legally enforceable obligation is broader than simply a 
contract between a utility and a QF and that the phrase is used to prevent an electric utility from 
avoiding its PURP A obligations by refusing to sign a contract, or as here, from delaying the 
signing of a contract, so that a later and lower avoided cost is applicable."74 
Yet, despite this clear directive, the Idaho PUC has three times concluded that because 
the Agreements between Idaho Power and Grouse Creek were not signed and dated before 
December 14, 2010, there was no legally enforceable obligation in effect prior to that date. 
2. There is no difference between an Execution Date Bright-Line Rule and an 
Effective Date Rule, and both violate PURP A 
In its first and second Grouse Creek Orders, the Idaho PUC said "the primary issue to be 
determined was whether the Agreements which utilize the published avoided cost rate were 
executed before the eligibility cap for published rates was lowered to 100 kW on December 14, 
2010."75 To resolve this "primary issue," the Idaho PUC adopted a "bright line rule" requiring 
71 
72 
See Cedar Creek, 137 FERC ~ 61,006 at~ 32. 
Id. at~ 36. 
73 Id. at~ 36 n.62, citing, Burbach Broad. Co. of Del. v. Elkins Radio Corp., 278 F.Jd 401, 
407-09 (4th Cir. 2002); Adjustrite Sys., Inc. v. GAB Bus. Services, Inc., 145 F.3d 543, 547-50 (2d 
Cir. 1998); Miller Constr. Co. v. Stresstek, 108 Idaho 187, 188-190, 697 P.2d 1201, 1202-04 
(Idaho 1985) 
74 Id. at~ 36. 
75 IPUC Order No. 32257, June 8, 2011, R. p. 229 (emphasis added). 
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that in order for the Agreements to be based on the published rates, the Agreements had to have 
been fully executed prior to the December 14, 2010 change in the eligibility cap. 76 
Subsequently, FERC in Cedar Creek held that the Idaho PUC's "bright-line" rule was 
illegal and a clear violation of FERC regulations entitling a QF to rates based on avoided costs 
calculated at the time the legally enforceable obligation is incurred. 77 In rejecting the Idaho 
PU C's bright-line rule of full-execution, FERC said: "when a state limits the methods through 
which a legally enforceable obligation may be created to only a fully-executed contract, the 
state's limitation is inconsistent with PURP A and our regulations implementing PURP A." 78 As 
earlier noted, FERC adopted the term "legally enforceable obligation" rather than the term 
"contract" to prevent a utility from refusing to sign a contract, or delaying the signing of a 
contract until after rates are lower. 79 Following Cedar Creek, FERC has twice reaffirmed its 
position that the Idaho PUC's reliance on its 'fully executed' "bright line" rule was "inconsistent 
with PURPA and our [FERC's] regulations implementing PURPA, particularly section 
292.304( d)(2)."80 
Moreover, FERC's regulation and rulings are entirely consistent with the principles of 
contract law. "[A]n agreement is not unenforceable merely because it is subject to the approval 
76 Id. at p. 10, R. p. 230. 
77 137 FERC at~ 61,006, ~~ 30 - 32, citing 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(d)(2)(ii), "Each qualifying facility 
shall have the option ... to provide energy or capacity pursuant to a legally enforceable obligation for the 
delivery of energy or capacity over a specified term, in which case the rates for such purchase shall, at the 
option of the qualifying facility exercised prior to the beginning of the specified term, be based on either 
(i) the avoided costs calculated at the time of delivery; or (ii) the avoided costs calculated at the time the 
obligation is incurred." (emphasis added). 
78 
79 
Id. at~ 35; citing FERC Order No. 69, FERC Stats & Regs,~ 30, 128 at 30,880 (1980) . 
Id. at~ 36. 
80 Rainbow Ranch Wind, LLC and Rainbow West Wind, LLC, 139 FERC ~ 61,007 at~ 23 (April 30, 
2012); see also Murphy Flat Power, LLC, 141 FERC ~ 61, 145 (2012) (reaching the same conclusion). 
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of a formal contract."81 In the PURPA context, "the obligation to purchase power is imposed by 
law on a utility; it is not voluntarily assumed."82 Idaho law does not require a memorialization of 
an agreement to a formal writing as a precondition for the agreement to be legally enforceable -
even if such a requirement could overcome FERC' s rule in this particular context. 83 
In First National Mortgage, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the finding that a "Final Proposal" 
was binding because it clearly stated that its terms "are hereby accepted by the parties subject 
only to approval of the terms and conditions of a formal agreement."84 The circumstances here 
are indistinguishable. After waiting months to even obtain Idaho Power's draft contracts, Grouse 
Creek had fully committed itself to all material terms of the PPAs prior to December 14, 2010. 
The letters exchanged prior to December 14, 2010 evidence that Grouse Creek intended to 
obligate itself subject only to Idaho Power's final, Sarbanes-Oxley Act approval of the 
agreements. 85 
Responding to Cedar Creek and Rainbow Ranch, the Idaho PUC's third Order on 
Remand reconfigured the 'execution date' "bright-line" rule into an 'effective-date' rule, wherein 
the "effective date" of an Agreement, if one is noted in a PP A, is the only factor to be looked at 
in determining the date a legally obligation is established. This change in bright-line rule 
terminology - from 'execution date' to 'effective-date' - is a distinction without a difference. 
In essence, the Idaho PUC held that the prior established legally enforceable obligation 
date locked-in by the QF shifts to the notational date inserted by the utility on page 1 of a PPA, 
81 
82 
First Nat'! Mortgage Co. v. Fed. Realty Inv. Trust, 63 l F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 2011). 
Snow Mt. Pine Co. v. Maudlin, 84 Or. App. 590, 599, 734 P.2d 1366, 1370 (1987). 
83 See Evco Sound & Electronics, Inc. v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 148 Idaho 357, 365, 223 P.3d 740, 748 
(2009); Miller Const. Co. v. Stresstek, 108 Idaho 187, 188-89; 697 P.2d 1201, 1202-04 (1985). 
84 
85 
631 F.3d at 1065 (emphasis in original). 
Mikell Aff. at Exhibit J. 
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and that the QF "accept[s] that" legal consequence.86 In the Commission's own words, "When a 
contract has been entered into by the parties and submitted for approval, there is no need for a 
determination regarding any other legally enforceable obligation."87 As the Agreements' 
"effective dates" were December 28, 2010, the Commission opined that it need look no further 
than "the four comers of the Agreements"88 to determine that Grouse Creek was ineligible for 
pre-December 14, 2014, published rates. In effect, the Commission ruled that Grouse Creek had 
waived its PURP A/federal entitlement to published rates as of the date it had a previously 
established a legally enforceable obligation, because Idaho Power had hand-written in the 
numeral "28" on page 1 of the Agreements, a ministerial act Grouse Creek had no control over. 
To the contrary, Cedar Creek stands clearly for the principle that "executed contracts" 
and "legally enforceable obligations" are not the same thing and that a legally enforceable 
obligation is not nullified once a written contract is signed. 89 It is antithetical to think that the act 
of memorializing a legally enforceable obligation in a subsequent contract can extinguish that 
same legally enforceable obligation. Cedar Creek clearly rejected this 'form-trumps-substance' 
application when it said "Indeed, Commission [FERC] regulations and Order No. 69 expressly 
use the terms "contract" and "legally enforceable obligation" in the disjunctive to demonstrate 
that a legally enforceable obligation includes, but is not limited to, a contract."90 As FERC 
noted in Cedar Creek, "[A] QF, by committing itself to sell to an electric utility, also commits 
the electric utility to buy from the QF," thereby creating the legally enforceable obligation. 91 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
IPUC Order No. 32635, R. p. 359. 
Id. R. p. 358 (emphasis added). 
Id. R. p. 359. 
137 FERC ~ 61,006 at~ 35. 
Id. 
Id. at~ 32. 
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Grouse Creek was finally able to "lock-in" Idaho Power to legally enforceable 
obligations, no later than December 9, 2010, when it had provided all the necessary material 
project information to Idaho Power and unequivocally accepted all the material terms and 
conditions of the Agreements drafted by Idaho Power. The Idaho PUC staff agreed. Yet, 
according to the Commission, when Grouse Creek was finally presented with a written 
memorialization of its legally enforceable obligation, the ministerial act by Idaho Power of 
signing the Agreements and hand-writing an "effective date" that was after December 14, 2010, 
voided Grouse Creek's right to pre-December 14 rates.92 
In Cedar Creek, FERC said, with respect to the Idaho PUC's 'execution-date' "bright 
line" rule, that PURP A does not give states "unlimited discretion to limit the ways a legally 
enforceable obligation is incurred."93 The same admonition applies equally to the Idaho PUC's 
shift from a PPA's 'execution date' to its 'effective date.' This Court clearly articulated in 
Rosebud II that when the Idaho PUC's implementation of PURPA is "consistent with the FERC 
regulations" then the Commission has "regularly pursued its authority."94 Rosebud II also stands 
for the corollary, that when the Idaho PUC clearly and openly refuses to implement PURPA 
regulations in Idaho, as it has been specifically instructed by FERC to so do, the Commission is 
not "regularly pursuing its authority."95 
92 "The legally enforceable obligations of the parties are contained within the four comers 
of the Agreements." IPUC Order No. 32635, R. p. 359. 
93 137 FERC ~ 61,006 at~ 35. 
94 
95 
See Rosebud II, 128 Idaho at 632, 917 P.2d at 789. 
LC.§ 61-629. 
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3. Requiring a QF Developer to Successfully Conclude a Complaint Proceeding, 
as an Alternative to a Signed Contract, is a Violation of a Developer's Right 
to a Legally Enforceable Obligation under PURP A 
Perhaps as justification to avoid having to follow Idaho PUC Staff's recommendation in 
the remand case to approve the Grouse Creek Agreements "because a legally enforceable 
obligation was created no later than December 9, 2010"96, the Idaho PUC determined in its 
Order on Remand that a legally enforceable obligation cannot be created on a date other than 
contract's effective date, unless there is no agreed upon effective date between the parties97 and 
the QF successfully pursues a complaint that a contract memorializing that obligation would 
exist, but for the conduct of the utility.98 
To the contrary, there is nothing in the FERC regulations that requires the filing of a 
complaint and/or the culmination of complaint proceedings, in order to establish the date of a 
legally enforceable obligation, or that remotely stands for the proposition that if a QF elects to 
negotiate and executes a contract, a legally enforceable obligation cannot be created prior to 
contract finalization and execution. It could not be clearer from Cedar Creek, 99 Rainbow 
Ranch100 and Murphy Flat101 that a legally enforceable obligation can be created with or without 
96 Id. R. p. 315. (emphasis added). 
97 "[T]he Commission did not have to determine whether a legally enforceable obligation arose 
because the parties entered into a written agreement ... [with an] effective date of December 28, 2010." 
IPUC Order No. 32635, R. p. 362. 
98 "[I]f the utility is failing to negotiate or refusing to enter into a contract with a QF, the QF can file 
a complaint with this Commission, at which time the Commission will make a determination as to 
whether and when a legally enforceable obligation arose." Id. R. p. 358. The Commission recognized that 
Grouse Creek "filed a complaint on November 8, 2010." Id. at R. p. 359. However, the Commission then 
determined that because the parties were able to voluntarily negotiate agreements, the complaint process 
did not proceed and conclude, and as a consequence, "a [Commission] determination regarding a legally 
enforceable obligation was never triggered." Id. at R. p. 360. 
99 
100 
101 
Id. 137 FERC ~ 61,006. 
Id. 139 FERC ~ 61,007. 
Id. 141 FERC ~ 61,145. 
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a contract, before execution of that contract, and separate and apart from whether the QF chose 
to execute a contract or file a complaint. In short, the date by which a legally enforceable 
obligation arises is no more driven by whether a utility signs than by when it signs. 
Put simply, PURP A, FERC regulations and FERC rulings interpreting those regulations 
look to the date on which a legally enforceable obligation arose, rather than when the related 
contract is signed or is nominally effective. PURP A simply establishes the rights of QFs to sell 
power to utilities at avoided cost, and acknowledges that utilities have great incentive to refuse to 
negotiate and to delay negotiations, especially when there is an approaching date of significant 
price/eligibility reduction. In establishing the legally enforceable obligation standard under 
PURPA, FERC recognizes that when a utility is simultaneously negotiating with a QF, while 
also having every incentive to stall negotiations, the date establishing a legally enforceable 
obligation cannot be left in the hands of the utility. Yet, that is what the Idaho PUC has 
determined and the error that requires reversal by this Court. 
B. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE HOLDING OF THE IDAHO PUBLIC UTILITIES 
COMMISSION THAT GROUSE CREEK DID NOT ESTABLISH LEGALLY ENFORCEABLE 
CONTRACT RIGHTS BEFORE DECEMBER 14, 2010, FOR THE REASON THAT SUCH 
HOLDING IS AN ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS AND UNSUPPORTED BY THE RECORD 
1. The Commission's Decision Denying the Grouse Creek Agreements Was 
Arbitrary and Capricious, and a Violation of Its Previously Established 
Avoided Cost Grandfathering Criteria 
a. The History of Grandfathering: This Court has long recognized that 
"[ c ]onferment of grandfathered status on qualifying facility is essentially an IPUC finding that a 
legally enforceable obligation to sell power existed by a given date."102 
102 Rosebud Enterprises, Inc. v. Idaho Pub. Util. Comm 'n, 128 Idaho 609, 624, 917 P.2d 766, 781 
(1996) (Rosebud I). 
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In the 1990s the Idaho PUC faced several instances of changing avoided cost rates 
and QF developers claiming a grandfathered right to the previously higher rate. 103 As a 
consequence, the Commission established a two-part grandfathering test: either the QF and the 
utility signed a contract, or the QF must, before the date of rate change, "file[] a meritorious 
complaint alleging that the project was mature and that the developer had attempted, and failed, 
to negotiate a contract with the utility". 104 In A. W Brown this Court affirmed the Idaho PU C's 
decision that Brown was not entitled to grandfathered avoided cost rates, because Brown "did 
not filed a meritorious complaint with the PUC" before the date of the avoided cost rate change, 
"did not 'pursue a power contract with some diligence,' nor did Brown make a 'comprehensive 
binding offer,"' and that "Brown did not show that it was ready, willing and able to sign a 
contract' while the [prior] rates were in effect."105 
In 2005 the Idaho PUC revised its grandfathering test to no longer require the 
"filing of a meritorious complaint, " replacing it with a more balanced test focusing on the 
substance of whether the QF was "ready, willing and able," to perform. Thus, the Idaho PUC 
defined what constituted a grandfathered right to a legally enforceable obligation in IPUC Case 
No. IPC-E-05-22 106 IPUC Order Nos. 29839, 29851, and 29872 107 which, in a regulatory 
103 Changing the avoided cost rate, and changing the eligibility cap to avoided cost rates, are both a 
"rate change" in their substantive effect on a developer. To say a change in eligibility to rates is not a rate 
change is again a distinction without a difference. Any grandfathering criteria that would appropriately be 
applied to a "rate change" should equally apply to an "eligibility-to-rates" that are changed. A contrary 
assertion would ignore the reality of what the Commission is otherwise doing to affect QFs. By changing 
the eligibility cap rules, the Commission is by definition changing the rates that QFs are paid. 
104 A. W. Brown, 121 Idaho at 81 7, 828 P .2d at 846 ( 1992). 
105 Id. citing Empire Lumber Co. v. Wash. Water Power Co., 114 Idaho 191, 193, 755 P.2d 1229, 
1231 (1988) (Dismissal of Empire's complaint was appropriate because Empire had failed to demonstrate 
it was "ready, willing and able to sign a contract.") 
106 IPUC Case No. IPC-E-05-22, (2005) In the Matter of Suspending Idaho Power's PURPA 
Obligation. 
107 E.g., IPUC Order No. 29839 at 9-10 (2005). 
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action substantively identical to this case, also lowered the posted rate eligibility cap from 
10 aMW to 100 kW. 
Specifically, the Commission established the following grandfathering test for 
entitlement to previous avoided cost rates: First, the Idaho PUC would look to: "(1) submittal of 
a signed power purchase agreement to the utility, or (2) submittal to the utility of a completed 
Application for Interconnection Study and payment of fee." 108 Second, the Commission would 
look at the following "other indicia of substantial progress and project maturity," to determine 
whether "QF projects in the negotiating queue on that date" were entitled to a power purchase 
agreement: "(i) a wind study demonstrating a viable site for the project, (ii) a signed contract for 
wind turbines, (iii) arranged financing for the project, and/or (iv) related progress on the facility 
permitting and licensing path."109 The purpose of the indicative criteria was not to create a rigid 
checklist, but to "recognize and not discount the considerable time, effort and energy expended 
by some QFs in developing their projects" and to approve QF projects that have reached a level 
of project maturity on the basis of which they reasonably could be expected to be brought on line 
within a reasonable period following contract execution. 110 
Applying this new grandfathering criteria to a number of projects, the Idaho PUC 
first approved a contract between Idaho Power and Salmon Falls Wind Park LLC, noting that the 
project was "sufficiently mature" in its development to justify "grandfathering" status pursuant 
to the appropriate criteria, even though both Idaho Power and Salmon Falls Wind signed their 
108 IPUC Order No. 29872 at 9. 
109 Id. at 8 (quoting IPUC Order No. 29839 at 9-10). 
110 Id. at 10-11. The Commission did not require that the QF satisfy each of these indicia, but had 
intended only to provide example "criteria that could be looked to assess project maturity." Order No. 
29951 at5. 
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agreements after the date of a rate change. 111 Similarly, in July 2010, the Commission approved a 
QF contract between Idaho Power Company and Cargill, which, although negotiated prior to 
March 16, 2010 (the effective date for the change in published avoided cost rates), was not 
signed until May 4, 2010, for the reason that Idaho Power's "routine internal approval had not 
been completed .... " 112 
More importantly, at the same time Grouse Creek was attempting to obligate itself 
to published avoided cost rates, the Commission in November 2010, found that a legally 
enforceable obligation had been created between Idaho Power and Yellowstone Power, without 
evidence of any written correspondence between the parties. In Yellowstone Power Inc. the Idaho 
PUC approved a request for grandfathering into [pre March 16, 201 O] published avoided cost 
contracts for a contract not executed until July 28, 2010, again recognizing that a QF, without a 
signed contract, was able to demonstrate its entitlement to the previously-effective published 
avoided cost rates by satisfying other grandfathering criteria. 113 The Idaho PUC approved the 
agreement despite "the apparent lack of any written documentation ... evidencing that the terms 
of a power purchase agreement were materially complete [before the rate change]" in part 
because QF had "familiarity with PURPA projects and the standard terms of Idaho Power's 
power purchase agreements."114 
b. Grandfathering Applied to Grouse Creek: In spite of this well developed 
and often (even concurrently) applied grandfathering test, the Idaho PUC's first two rejections of 
Ill IPUC Order No. 29951 at 2, (January 2008) In the Matter of Salmon Falls Wind Park LLC. 
114 Id. (emphasis added). 
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the Grouse Creek Agreements were based on a newly announced "bright line" rule requiring 
fully executed contracts. Then, when FERC rejected this 'execution date' "bright line" rule as 
illegal, the Commission changed from an 'execution date' to an "effective date" rule. Neither 
rule, however, involves any of the substantive analysis required by PURPA, the Commission's 
2005 grandfathering standards, or by this Court's prior decisions regarding the grandfathering of 
legally enforceable obligations. Clearly, this June 8, 2011 abandonment of the Commission's 
grandfathering test and publication of a new 'execution date' "bright line" rule, and its 
metamorphosis into an 'effective date' rule, was an arbitrary and capricious departure from the 
Commission's previously well-established grandfathering tests, and of PURPA's rules and 
regulations regarding legally enforceable obligations. 
c. The Idaho PUC's Failure to Explain Its Departure from Prior 
Grandfathering Rules: It is a basic tenet of administrative law that an agency reversing its prior 
policy faces a heightened burden to reverse course. 115 As the Court said in Rosebud I, the Idaho 
PUC "must explain the reasoning employed to reach its conclusions in order to ensure that the 
IPUC has applied relevant criteria prescribed by statute or its own regulations and thus has not 
acted arbitrarily or capriciously." 116 Although the Idaho PUC is "not so rigorously bound by the 
doctrine of stare decisis that it must decide all future cases in the same way, 117 it still must 
"adequately explain" a deviation from its regulations or prior cases " so that the reviewing court 
I 15 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of US., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42, 
103 S. Ct. 2856, 77 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1983) ("an agency changing its course by rescinding a rule is obligated 
to supply a reasoned analysis for the change beyond that which may be required when an agency does not 
act in the first instance."). 
I 16 See Rosebud I, 128 Idaho at 618, 917 P.2d at 775. 
117 Intermountain Gas Co. v. Idaho Pub. Util. Comm 'n, 97 Idaho 113, 119, 540 P.2d 775, 781 
(1975). 
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can determine that the decisions are not arbitrary and capricious."118 In Washington Water 
Power, this court said the Idaho PUC "must demonstrate that it has applied the criteria prescribed 
by statute and by its own regulations and has not acted arbitrarily or on an ad hoc basis." 119 
Synonyms for ad hoc include 'improvised' and 'off-the-cuff. 
In this case, the Idaho PUC has failed to adequately explain the basis of 
abandoning its 2005 grandfathering tests - which provided a balanced review of the facts and 
circumstances - and adopting not one, but two improvised rules seeking the obvious and 
intended result of rejecting the Agreements, based on form-over-substance. In spite of its own 
Staff recommendation to approve the Grouse Creek Agreements [because Staff concurred that 
Grouse Creek had established a legally enforceable obligation as of December 9, 2010] 120 the 
Commission walked away from all of its and this Court's prior grandfathering precedents. In 
essence, none of the facts involving either Grouse Creek's significant capital investment or 
protracted negotiations with Idaho Power mattered. Instead, the Idaho PUC simply found that 
"when a contract has been entered into by the parties and submitted for approval, there is no need 
for a determination regarding any other legally enforceable obligation." 121 This explanation falls 
substantially short of this Court's requirement that the Idaho PUC "adequately explain" its 
deviation from prior rulings "so that the reviewing court can determine that the decisions are not 
b. d . . ,,122 ar 1trary an capnc10us. 
118 
119 
120 
121 
122 
Id. 
Wash. Water Power, 101 Idaho at 575, 617 P.2d at 1250. 
R. p. 315. 
IPUC Order No. 32635, R. p. 358. 
Id. Intermountain Gas, 97 Idaho 113, 540 P.2d 781. 
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2. The Commission's Findings Of Fact Are Unsupported By The Record, and 
Are Therefore Unavailing 
Finally, in an effort to buttress its third rejection of the Grouse Creek Agreements on 
something other than newly created and mechanically applied rules, the Commission noted that 
the "evidence and the conduct of the parties"123 with respect to three "findings of fact" did not 
support Grouse Creek's assertion that a legally enforceable obligation was created on 
December 9, 2010. First, the Commission found that Grouse Creek had "failed to name" the 
appropriate transmission entity until December 15, 2010, "a day after the eligibility cap was 
reduced." 124 Second, the Idaho PUC ruled that Grouse Creek had also "failed to provide a proper 
legal description of the project's location" before December 14, 2010. 125 Finally, the 
Commission found that Grouse Creek's December 9, 2010, email asking Idaho Power whether it 
would be "OK" [or not] to slip the projects' start date indicated that material contract 
negotiations were ongoing as of December 15, 2010. 126 None of these three findings are based 
on substantial evidence in the record. 
a. The 'Naming' of the Transmission Entity: Concerning the first finding of 
fact, the Commission relied exclusively on Idaho Power's brief on Remand asserting that 
"Grouse Creek had in previous communications from the Projects had indicated at different 
times both BP A and PacifiCorp,"127 which in turn referenced an email from Idaho Power to 
Grouse Creek dated December 15, 2010, asking that Grouse Creek [again] confirm the name of 
123 
124 
125 
126 
IPUC Order No. 32635, R. pp. 360, 361. 
Id. 
Id. 
Id. R. p. 361. 
127 Idaho Power Company's Memorandum on Remand, IPUC Case No. IPC-E-10-61, 62 (Feb. 6, 
2011) R. p. 307. 
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the transmitting entity. Based on this single representation from Idaho Power, the Commission 
held that the 'name of the transmitting utility' was still a matter of "active negotiation. 128" 
Ignored completely by the Commission in Order No. 32635 was the extensive 
record Grouse Creek laid out, where it had on numerous occasions identified BP A as the correct 
transmission carrier of energy from the projects to Idaho Power: For examples, see: (i) March 2, 
2010, email from Idaho Power to Grouse Creek verifying that BPA will be the transmitting entity 
and asking if "the BP A process requires a no- refundable deposit" to start transmission studies; 129 
(ii) March 12, 2010, letter from Idaho Power to Grouse Creek stating "we [Idaho Power] have a 
pretty good understanding of the Interconnection status and potential BP A solutions we need to 
put into motion the process of documenting the various [transmission] requirements;"130 (iii) 
June 16, 2010, Idaho Power Transmission Capacity Application Questionnaire where Required 
Item "S" asked the name of the "Transmission Provider" and Grouse Creek answered 
"Bonneville Power Administration;"131 (iv) July 13, 2010, correspondence wherein Grouse 
Creek notified Idaho Power that it was downsizing to two separate 10 aMW projects and 
resubmitting Idaho Power's Transmission Capacity Application Questionnaire which again 
confirmed at Item "S" that "BPA" would be the Transmission Provider;"132 (v) August 17, 2010, 
email from Grouse Creek to Idaho Power stating "Bonneville Power Administration will deliver 
the output to an interconnection with your system at the Minidoka Substation in Southern 
Idaho;" 133 (vi) October 1, 2010, correspondence from Grouse Creek legal counsel to Idaho 
128 
129 
130 
131 
132 
133 
See IPUC Order No. 32635, R. p. 361. 
Ex. p. 22. 
Ex. p. 33. 
Ex. p. 40. 
Ex. pp. 46, 52. 
Ex. p. 62. 
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Power objecting to Idaho Power's requirement that Grouse Creek secure BPA transmission 
service before Idaho Power will sign the PPAs. 134 In addition, (vii) paragraph 7 of the November 
8, 2010, Formal Complaints Grouse Creek filed against Idaho Power for refusal to negotiate in 
good faith stated that "The Grouse Creek [] project[ s] will ... wheel the output through 
Bonneville Power Administration ("BP A") for delivery of the output to Idaho Power's system at 
the Minidoka substation."135 
Yet, in spite of this overwhelming evidence having been presented to the Idaho 
PUC, 136 the Commission discussed none of it and weighed none of it against Idaho Power's 
request from Grouse Creek to again identify the transmitting entity. Instead, the Idaho PUC 
grounded its rejection of the Agreements on a finding that material, substantive contract 
negotiations "were still in flux" 137 because Idaho Power had to again ask 'who will be the 
transmitting utility?' 
b. The Location of the Two Wind Projects: The second finding of fact by the 
Idaho PUC - accepting Idaho Power's assertion that Grouse Creek had "failed to provide Idaho 
Power a complete location designation" 138 - was equally lacking in evidentiary backing and 
contrary to the established record. The only factual support for this Commission finding again 
comes from Idaho Power's December 14, 2010 self-serving email to Grouse Creek asking for 
134 Ex.pp. 80, 81, 88, 89. 
135 See Grouse Creek's Motion to Augment Agency Record to include the Complaints, which at the 
date of submittal of this memorandum, the Court had yet to rule. See pages 1189 and p. 1199 of the 
Complaints. 
136 See Grouse Creek's Reply Legal Brief on Remand, R. p. 343. 
137 
138 
IPUC Order No. 32635, R. p. 361. 
Id. R. p. 360. 
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clarification of the property "Sections" for each of the two projects. 139 Grouse Creek admits it 
mistakenly left the "section" box blank in the December 2, 2010 draft PP A it sent to Idaho 
Power. However, exact site specific information, along with meets-and-bounds property 
descriptions, had been provided in writing to Idaho Power on October 1, 2010. 140 In addition, 
Grouse Creek had previously provided a sworn affidavit testifying that the two projects were 
greater than a mile apart. 141 
The fact that Idaho Power asked again on December 14, 2010 for clarification of 
property descriptions, because Grouse Creek on one occasion failed to properly 'fill-in-a-blank' 
as to the property sections, but twice previously had properly identified the property sections, 
does not easily - or at all - lead to the conclusion that the parties were "actively negotiating" 
material terms of the Agreements. 142 Again, Commission Order No. 32635 is absent any 
discussion and balancing of the evidence presented by Grouse Creek that it had previously 
supplied Idaho Power with correct property descriptions and sworn testimony that the projects 
were greater than one mile apart, versus Idaho Power's single request for "section" confirmation. 
c. The Date of Commercial Operation: The third finding of fact the 
Commission relies on to reject the Agreements is that the Parties were "actively negotiating"143 a 
Commission described "amendment"144 to the commercial operation date of the projects, because 
Grouse Creek, on December 9, 2011 asked if it would be "OK" to delay the start of operation by 
139 The Idaho Power email correctly noted the "township", "range" and "county" for the two 
projects, but asked again for "section" confirmation. See Ex. p. 517. 
140 
141 
142 
143 
144 
Ex. pp. 82-83, Ex. pp. 90-92. 
See Mikell Aff. ifif 4-11, Ex. pp. 4, 5. 
Id R. p. 361. 
IPUC Order No. 32635 p, 15, R. p 360. 
Id p. 16, R. p. 361. 
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six months. 145 Idaho Power waited for six days, again until after December 14, 2010, the day 
after the rate eligibility change, to answer this simple question, by saying yes. 
Considering that Grouse Creek had a clear PURP A right to tell Idaho Power when 
it intends to commence energy deliveries, (i.e., the date on which Idaho Power's legally 
enforceable obligation to purchase begins)146 there was really nothing for Idaho Power to 
contemplate, accept or reject, if Grouse Creek was requesting a date change, which in fact, it was 
not. It was simply a "process" question by Grouse Creek; whether a date change would affect 
Idaho Power's "process" of finalizing and printing the Agreements. But, if the Commission 
believed that Grouse Creek was requesting a change in the "start date" for delivering energy 
under the Agreements, and if the start date is a material contract term, then it is clear that Grouse 
Creek also committed [i.e., "locked-in"] Idaho Power to the Agreements on December 9, 2010, 
when it informed Idaho Power that purchases would begin on that date, as Grouse Creek is 
legally entitled to do so under PURP A. 147 Idaho PUC staff agrees. 148 As FERC said in Cedar 
Creek, [A] QF, by committing itself to sell to an electric utility, also commits the electric utility 
to buy from the QF."149 Idaho Power's reply six days later, on December 16, 2010 was simply a 
courtesy acknowledging that the date change would not impact the 'processing' of the 
Agreements. 
145 The question by Grouse Creek to Idaho Power on December 9, 2010: "[W]hat would be your 
reaction if we moved the on line dates from first energy 12/12 and COD 6/13 to first energy 6/13 and 
COD 12/14? Would we still be o.k. in the process you have going?" Ex. p. 520. Idaho Power answered on 
December 15, 2010 that it "can accept your request" for a change in dates. Ex. p. 522. (emphasis added) 
146 See 18 C.F.R. § 292.304( d) allowing a QF to require a utility to purchase power "pursuant to a 
legally enforceable obligation" with rates established "at the option of the qualifying facility" based on 
"the avoided costs calculated at the time the obligation is incurred. 
147 Id. 
148 Id R. p. 315 ("Staff believes that a legally enforceable obligation was incurred no later than 
December 9, 2010-the date upon which the projects modified their on-line dates.") 
149 137 FERC il 61,006 at il 32. 
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d The Idaho PUC's 3 Findings of Fact Do Not Rest on Substantial Evidence 
of the Record: As demonstrated, the overwhelming weight of the evidence clearly establishes 
that by December 9, 2010, (i) BPA was to be the transmitting utility, (ii) the Projects' locations 
had been correctly communicated to Idaho Power, and (iii) Grouse Creek had committed to a 
start date. 
As this Court has said, the Idaho PUC's findings of fact must be "based on 
substantial, competent evidence."150 In addition, "the IPUC's findings of fact must be affirmed 
unless it appears that the clear weight of the evidence is against the conclusion, or that the 
evidence is strong and persuasive that the IPUC has abused its discretion."151 Finally, "[t]he 
IPUC's findings of fact are not to be disturbed on appeal unless this Court concludes that the 
IPUC's findings are against the clear weight of the evidence or that the evidence is strong and 
persuasive that the IPUC abused its discretion." 152 Contrary to this well established law, the 
Commission's three findings of fact were instead based on "mere scintillas" 153 of evidence, 
ignoring the weight of the evidence in the record to the contrary. 
In International Firefighters this Court said: "The 'substantial evidence rule' is 
said to be a 'middle position' which precludes a de nova hearing but which nonetheless requires 
a serious review which goes beyond the mere ascertainment of procedural regularity." 154 The 
150 Id. Rosebud I, 128 Idaho at 618, 917 P.2d at 775. See also Wash. Water Power, 101 Idaho at 575, 
617 P.2d at 1250 ("Not only must the Commission make and enter proper findings of fact, but it must set 
forth its reasoning in a rational manner."). 
151 A. W Brown, 121 Idaho at 816, 828 P.2d at 845. 
152 Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. v. Intermountain Gas Co., 100 Idaho 368, 376, 597 P.2d 1058, 1066 
( 1979) (emphasis added). 
153 Intern 'l Ass 'n of Firefighters v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 99 Idaho 630, 633, 586 P.2d 1346, 1349 
(1978). 
154 Id. 
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Court in Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Hunnicutt155 elaborated on International Firefighters, affirming 
that"[ s ]uch a review requires more than a mere "scintilla" of evidence in support of the agency's 
determination, 156 though "something less than the weight of the evidence." 157 '"Put simply', we 
wrote [in International Firefighters] 'the substantial evidence rule requires a court to determine 
'whether [the agency's] findings of fact are reasonable. ,,,1 58 In judging the reasonableness of an 
agency's findings of fact, "reviewing courts should not 'read only one side of the case and, if 
they find any evidence there' sustain the administrative action and ignore the record to the 
contrary." 159 Instead, this Court requires that the evidence supporting an agency decision must be 
"substantial, when viewed in the light that the record in its entirety furnishes, including the body 
of evidence opposed to the [agency's] view." 160 
The Idaho PUC based its first two factual findings (transmission entity name and 
project locations) on "mere scintillas" of evidence, which were nothing more than post 
December 14, 2010, 'seeds-of-doubt' planted by Idaho Power, regarding 'when' contract terms 
were finalized. In addition, the Commission neither acknowledged nor discussed the substantial 
evidence to the contrary, that there was no legitimate question as to the projects' locations, or 
who the transmitting utility was. For example, there is no discussion in Commission Order 32635 
as why the seven times Grouse Creek indicated in writing that BP A was to be the transmitting 
utility, and the one time Idaho Power said "we understand" that BP A is to be the transmitting 
155 
156 
157 
158 
Idaho State Ins. Fundv. Hunnicutt, 110 Idaho 257, 260, 715 P.2d 927, 930 (1985). 
Citation omitted. 
Citing Consolo v. FMC, 3 83 U.S. 607, 620, 86 S. Ct. 1018, 1026, 16 L. Ed. 2d 131 (1966). 
Hunnicutt, 110 Idaho at 261, 715 P.2d at 930. 
159 Hunnicutt, 110 Idaho at 259, 715 P.2d at 930; quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. Nat'l Labor 
Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 474, 477, 71 S. Ct. 456, 459, 95 L. Ed. 456 (1951). 
160 Id. (emphasis added). 
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utility, were of substantially less evidentiary weight than Idaho Power's eleventh hour request 
asking for clarification of the name of the transmitting utility. Nor could the Commission 
reasonable conclude that the operation date of the projects was also in question, because Idaho 
Power waited from December 9 until December 16 to respond to Grouse Creek question of it 
being "OK" to slip the operation dates. 
Plainly, the Idaho PUC's findings "were made upon evidence which clearly does 
not support" such findings, and "is an arbitrary act against which courts afford relief." 161 It is 
evident from a reading of the entirety of Order No. 3263 5 that the Idaho PUC' s rejections of the 
Grouse Creek Agreements had very little to do with Grouse Creek facts, and was primarily 
focused on immediately implementing the Commission's policy changes for wind power QF rate 
eligibility. As a legislative body, the Idaho PUC is entitled to do that. However, when that 
change materially and adversely impacts a party like Grouse Creek, that has worked for years 
and invested hundreds of thousands of dollars relying on previously established rules, then the 
change, as it applies to that party, must not be arbitrary and capricious, and must be grounded on 
substantial evidence in the record. Order No 32635 and its predecessor Orders fail that test of 
"reasonableness." 162 
C. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE RULING OF THE IDAHO PUC REJECTING THE 
GROUSE CREEK AGREEMENTS FOR THE REASON THAT THEY CONTAINED AGREED-TO 
RATES, TERMS AND CONDITIONS AS AUTHORIZED BY PURPA 18 C.F.R § 292.30l(B) 
AND THE IDAHO PUC IS WITHOUT POWER TO REJECT SUCH AGREEMENTS 
Regulations under PURP A do not limit or restrict a utility's ability to sign contracts for 
QF power at rates different than the PURPA approved avoided cost rate. Nor does PURPA's 
161 
162 
Wash. Water Power, 101 Idaho at 575, 617 P.2d at 1250. 
Hunnicutt, 110 Idaho at 261, 715 P .2d at 931. 
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requirement that a utility purchase QF power at avoided cost "affect the validity of any contract 
entered into between a Qualifying Facility and an electric utility for any purchase." 163 
In footnote 73 in Cedar Creek, FERC noted this alternative regulation as another avenue 
it could have taken, in determining that the Idaho PUC' s rejection of Cedar Creek's contracts 
were in violation of PURPA. In footnote 73, FERC said: 
The record in this proceeding also suggests that provisions of section 292.30l(b) 
of the [FERC] regulations may be applicable to Idaho PUC's decision in the June 
8 Order. Section 292.301(b)(l) permits a QF and an electric utility to enter into a 
contract containing agreed-to rates, terms, or conditions that may differ from 
those that would otherwise be required by the [FERC's] regulations concerning 
the determination of avoided cost rates. The [FERC] reasoned that a contracted-
for-rate would never exceed true avoided costs and thus would be consistent with 
PURPA. Order No. 69, FERC Stats. & Regs. i! 30,128 at 30,868. Moreover, 
section 292.301(b)(2) provides that the [FERCs] avoided cost regulations (and a 
state's implementation of those regulations) do not affect the validity of any 
contract entered into between a QF and an electric utility. Accordingly, the 
Idaho PUC' s rejection of the contract entered into by Rocky Mountain Power 
and Cedar Creek, on the ground that the avoided-cost rate contained in the 
contract is excessive, appears inconsistent with PURP A and the [FERC's] 
regulations implementing PURP A. 164 
The Idaho PUC rests the core of its argument in not approving the Grouse Creek 
Agreements in its Remand Order No. 32635 on the fact that Idaho Power and Grouse Creek 
voluntarily negotiated and signed such Agreements with an effective date of December 28, 2010, 
and that the agreements were not in the public interest because they contained rates that were in 
163 18 C.F.R. § 292.301 Scope. (a) Applicability. This subpart applies to the regulation of sales and 
purchases between qualifying facilities and electric utilities. 
(b) Negotiated rates or terms. Nothing in this subpart: 
164 
( 1) Limits the authority of any electric utility or any qualifying facility to agree to a rate for any 
purchase, or terms or conditions relating to any purchase, which differ from the rate or terms or 
conditions which would otherwise be required by this subpart; or 
(2) Affects the validity of any contract entered into between a qualifying facility and an electric 
utility for any purchase. (emphasis added). 
137 FERC ~ 61,006 at p. 17, footnote 73 (emphasis added). 
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excess of avoided cost rates Grouse Creek was eligible for on that date. 165 Such a finding, the 
Commission noted, was "entirely consistent with ... the authority granted to us by PURP A and 
FERC."166 Specifically, the Idaho PUC said that its approval of the Agreements containing "a 
rate in excess of the utility's avoided cost would clearly be a violation of PURPA and FERC's 
. 1 . ul . ,,167 imp ementmg reg at1ons. 
To the contrary, the Idaho PUC's rejection of the Grouse Creek Agreements violates 
Section 292.301(b) of FER C's regulations, which instead clearly requires that the Commission 
honor contracts negotiated under PURP A, even if those contracts contain "agreed to" rates that 
are different than those that the Commission would otherwise require. To the extent the Idaho 
PUC wants to rely on the express terms of the Agreements, including their effective dates, the 
Commission then must also accept the avoided cost rates contained therein, because 18 C.F .R. § 
292.301(b) allows the rates in a negotiated agreement to be effective. Accordingly, the Idaho 
PUC's failure to approve the Agreements because they contained incorrect avoided cost rates 
(i.e., the "rate ... otherwise ... required" 168) is a clear violation of PURP A. 
VIII. GROUSE CREEK IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES 
LC.§ 12-121 provides that this court may award attorney's fees to the prevailing party. 
The basis for Grouse Creek's claim for an award of attorney's fees, should it prevail in its 
appeal, is that the Idaho PUC has acted without a foundation or reasonable basis in law in 
continuing to defend this case, in light of FERC' s decisions in Cedar Creek, Rainbow Ranch, 
and Murphy Flat, and for disregarding its own Staffs recommendation to approve the 
165 IPUC Order No. 32635, p. 10, R. p. 355. ("We recognized and chose to enforce the terms of the 
Agreements that the parties entered into voluntarily.") 
166 
167 
168 
Id p. 11, R. p. 356. 
Id. p. 16, R. p. 361. 
18 C.F.R. § 292.30l(b)(l) 
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Agreements because Grouse Creek had established a PURP A right to a legally enforceable 
obligation as of December 9, 2010. 
As discussed above, FERC's three decisions clearly state that the Idaho PUC's 
'execution-date' "bright line" rule is an illegal implementation of PURP A. The same FERC 
rebuke applies to the Idaho PUC's substitution of an 'effective date' rule for an 'execution date' 
rule. Each is equally an illegal, mechanical rejection of Grouse Creek's right to a legally 
enforceable obligation under PURP A. This Court clearly articulated in Rosebud II that when the 
Idaho PUC's implementation of PURPA is not consistent with the FERC regulations, the 
Commission has not "regularly pursued its authority," as required by I.C. § 61-629. 169 
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) provides that an award of attorney's fees under I.C. § 12-121 is 
warranted when a case is defended "unreasonable or without foundation." 170 The Idaho PUC's 
continuing refutation of FERC' s decisions is an "unreasonable" rejection of specific, controlling 
legal guidance, and the Commission's decision to continue denying approval of the Grouse 
Creek Agreements is "without foundation." 171 
Finally, it was unreasonable and without foundation that the Idaho PUC rejected its own 
Staffs recommendation to approve the Grouse Creek Agreements. 172 In an analogous case, this 
Court affirmed the award of attorney's fees by a district court against a state agency when that 
169 Rosebud II, 128 Idaho at 632, 917 P.2d at 789. 
170 Sinclair & Co. v. Gurule, 114 Idaho 362, 757 P.2d 225 (Ct. App. 1988) (Attorney's fees will be 
awarded when the appeal was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without 
foundation). See also Hales v. King, 114 Idaho 916, 762 P.2d 829 (Ct. App. 1988). 
171 IPUC Order No. 32635: "FERC['s] Declaratory Order in Cedar Creek is not binding on the 
Commission; FERC's Declaratory Order leads us to doubt whether FERC understood the basis upon 
which this Commission made its initial decision to disapprove the Agreements." R. p. 357 
172 Idaho PUC Staff Legal Brief, February 6, 2012: "Based on a reasonable interpretation of the facts 
in this case, and the actions of both the projects and Idaho Power, Staff believes that a legally enforceable 
obligation was incurred no later than December 9, 2010-the date upon which the projects modified their 
on-line dates." R. p. 315. 
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agency rejected the advice of one if its hearings officers and instead chose to "rely solely on its 
'specialized knowledge' and experience to reach the opposite conclusion." 173 Likewise, it was 
unreasonable for the Idaho PUC to reject the sound legal advice of its own Staff and again affirm 
its rejection of the Grouse Creek Agreements. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons outlined above, Grouse Creek seeks from this Court: 
(a) Reversal of the Orders and decision by the Idaho Public Utilities Commission to 
not approve the Agreements between Idaho Power and Grouse Creek, 
b) Remand back to the Idaho PUC for approval of the Agreements, but with 
modifications to the Agreements to equitably place Grouse Creek back into the same commercial 
position it would have been, had the Agreements been approved on June 8, 2010, and 
173 
c) An award of attorney's fees and costs on appeal to Grouse Creek. 
L t 'v--DATED this_/_ day of March, 2013. 
Ronald L. Williams, ISB 3034 
Williams Bradbury, P.C. 
Attorneys for Grouse Greek 
Ater v. Idaho Bureau of Occupational Licenses, 144 Idaho 281, 285, 160 P.3d 438, 442 (2007). 
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